Mobile readers are used more and more remarkably, so a persistent connection between a backend server and mobile readers cannot be guaranteed, it brings higher security requirements for RFID systems. RFID search protocol which is used to find specific tags has many applications such as inventory management, supply chain management. In this paper, a hash-based RFID search protocol for mobile readers is proposed, it can meet all known major attacks in RFID systems, and it can protect the privacy of mobile reader holders especially.
Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology which is used to automatically identify objects by wireless scanning without manual intervention; it has been used in various real-life application fields such as supply chain management, transportation, e-payment system, patient medical care. Comparing with traditional barcode technology, it has many advantages. A typical RFID system consists of a backend server, readers and tags.
Key feature of RFID systems is a lack of physical contact between readers and tags, based on wireless communication; signal broadcasting, the existing RFID systems are vulnerable to many security attacks and privacy disclosure threats. Due to strictly limited calculation resources, small storage capacity and faint power supply of low-cost tags, it is difficult to apply an ordinary and complicated but safe cryptographic algorithm to a RFID system and these factors are hindering the rapid spread of this technology [1] . So designing an efficient and low-cost security scheme for RFID systems becomes a challenging and important research object.
Recently, combining mobile technology with traditional RFID systems, through the integration of reading chips, PDA, and mobile devices, hence mobile RFID, such mobile readers are used more and more remarkably [2] [3] [4] [5] , so a persistent connection between a backend server and mobile readers cannot be guaranteed, it brings higher security requirements for RFID systems.
Many RFID security protocols have been proposed recently. Usually, beyond RFID authentication protocols, the requirements for RFID systems from various application fields call for more cryptographic protocols, for instance, RFID search protocol. RFID search The main contribution of this paper is to propose a hash-based RFID search protocol for mobile readers. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the second section, security requirements for RFID search protocols design are generalized. In the third section, the related research work is introduced. In the forth section, a new hash-based RFID search protocol is proposed. In the fifth section, security properties of the proposed protocol are analyzed. Finally, the conclusion of this paper is provided in the sixth section.
Security Requirements for RFID Search Protocols
Mobile RFID systems are confronted with more kinds of security threats than fixed RFID systems, for a search protocol of mobile RFID systems; it should meet security requirements as follows:
(1)Tag untraceability If responding message from a tag always contains a changeless value, namely the response are linkable to each other or distinguishable from those of other tags, an adversary can recognize and locate the tag by intercepting and analyzing. That is to say, the location privacy of the user (human being, or animal, or article) that attached by the tag can be traced [7] .
(2)Reader untraceability
The privacy of mobile holders should be considered. Since users commonly handle mobile readers while RFID-tagged objects are attached to goods or products in RFID tag search systems. Moreover, the signal strength of a reader is much stronger than that of a tag. So a message from a reader can be more easily eavesdropped than a message from a tag [8] . If querying message from a mobile reader always contains a changeless value, an adversary can recognize and locate the reader by intercepting and analyzing. That is to say, the location privacy of the holder that attached by the reader can be traced.
(3)Tag information protection
A tag is always attached to an article, or a human being, or an animal, so through all the execution access of a search protocol, an illegimate user should not acquire the legimate holder's detailed information. According to whether the backend server and a tag update the identifier or not in an entire authentication access, RFID authentication protocols are divided into dynamic ID mechanism and static ID mechanism. For the protocols based on dynamic ID mechanism, in a execution access of corresponding authentication protocol of this RFID system, if an adversary disturbs the communications between a reader and a tag by means of intercepting or blocking messages transmitted, the secret value that shared between the server and the tag cannot be updated successfully in this authentication access, it would cause losing synchronization between the backend server and the tag, if this RFID system search for this specific tag at that time, the search process maybe fail, so the design of a search protocol should solve this problem.
(6)Privacy of search result
The other privacy requirement to be considered is the search result of a mobile reader. It is undesirable to reveal the search result of a mobile reader. In some circumstances to an adversary, it might be useful information whether a mobile reader holder found a particular tag or not [8] . So a well designed search protocol should protect privacy of search result from an illegal user.
Related work
Presently, for the reason of convenient using and cost, lightweight methods like Hash, PRNG and CRC are used wildly in design of RFID security protocols. Especially, hash-based protocols have been researched wildly.
To solve the security and privacy problems in RFID tag search systems, many search protocols have been proposed recently [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] .
Review of Tan et al.'s RFID search protocol
In 2008, Tan et al. proposed server-less RFID search protocol [16] . However, there are two shortcomings of security and performance in Tan et al.'s mechanism as follows:
(1)In the step1 of Tan et al.'s server-less RFID search protocol request message from a reader always contains a changeless value R i , namely an adversary can recognize and locate the reader by intercepting and analyzing. That is to say, the location privacy of the user that attached by the reader could be traced.
(2)Low-cost passive tags have constraint requirements of limited resources, using less hardware cost is an important research object, we can see that using pseudo random number generator in tags leads to extra hardware cost, usually, about 700-800 logic gates is needed to implementing a pseudo random number generator. More seriously, these two protocols use two hash functions each. So it is unpractical for low-cost RFID systems. (1)In Ji et al.'s server-less RFID search protocol, request message from a reader always contains a changeless value R i , namely an adversary can recognize and locate the reader by intercepting and analyzing. That is to say, the location privacy of the user that attached by the reader could be traced.
Review of Ji et al.'s RFID search protocol
(2)Low-cost passive tags have constraint requirements of limited resources, using less hardware cost is an important research object, and we can see that using pseudo random number generator in tags leads to extra hardware cost.
A typical server-less search protocol [8] in 2011 is introduced as follows: 
143
The execution access of the original search protocol:
Step1: Server→Reader: E Ti (RID j ⊕ID i )
The server chooses the ID of specific tag(ID i ) and calculates E Ti (RID j ⊕ID i ), then sends E Ti (RID j ⊕ID i ) to the reader (RID j ).
Step2: Reader→Tag: E IDi (RID j ⊕N R) , N R After receiving E Ti (RID j ⊕ID i) from the server, the reader would store E Ti (RID j ⊕ID i ) in its memory and generate a random N R , then calculate E IDi (RID j ⊕N R ) and send E IDi (RID j ⊕N R ), N R to tags. After receiving E Ki (ID⊕N T ), N T from each tag, the reader should calculate K i * = E Ti (RID j ⊕ID i )⊕N R and ID' = D Ki* ( E Ki (ID⊕N R ))⊕N R . If ID i = ID', the specific tag is searched, or the tag is not the specific tag that the server would search.
This protocol is simple and clear, but there are two problems as follows:
(1)Losing synchronization between the server and a tag In a execution access of corresponding authentication protocol of this RFID system, if an adversary disturbs the communications between a reader and a tag by means of intercepting or blocking messages transmitted, the secret value T that shared between the server and the tag maybe not be updated successfully in this authentication access, it could cause losing synchronization between the backend server and the tag, so in this search protocol, T i in E Ti (RID j ⊕ID i ) is not equal to T stored in the tag, the legitimate tag cannot be searched by the backend server again.
(2)Computation cost of a tag is high
In this search protocol, the encryption method between the server and a tag use symmetrical encryption function like AES. Usually, the one-way hash function has lower cost than symmetrical encryption function, so this search protocol and its corresponding authentication protocol are not suitable for the low-cost RFID system. For solving these two problems, we propose a new RFID search protocol for mobile readers based on one-way hash function. 
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A New RFID Search Protocol based on One-way Hash Function
Notation
Assumptions
(1)The channel between the server and a reader is assumed insecure for wireless connection, and the channel between a reader and a tag is assumed insecure either, we assume that an adversary could observe and manipulate communications between insecure channels.
(2)The resources of each passive tag are constrained. In this protocol, each tag only needs to have a one-way hash function H(), XOR operation capability and concatenation operation capability.
(3)A tag is not vulnerable to compromised with an adversary, that is to say, the adversary cannot acquire the inner information of the tag.
(4)The one-way hash function H() is secure enough ageist brute exhaustive search from an adversary.
Initialization phase
In this phase, the backend server needs to have a one-way hash function H(), A pseudo random number generator PRNG(), and stores Table RID, Table ID ; A reader needs to have a one-way hash function H(), A pseudo random number generator PRNG(), and stores its own RID; A tag needs to have a one-way hash function H(), A pseudo random number generator PRNG(), and stores its own ID and secret value S.
Search protocol
Figure 4. The proposed search protocol
The execution access of the proposed protocol:
The Server chooses the ID of specific tag(ID i ) and calculates H(S new_i ⊕ID i ⊕RID j ), H(S new_i ⊕ID i ), H(S old_i ⊕ID i ⊕RID j ), H(S old_i ⊕ID i ), subsequently sends H(S new_i ⊕ID i ⊕RID j ), H(S new_i ⊕ID i ), H(S old_i ⊕ID i ⊕RID j ), H(S old_i ⊕ID i ) to the reader (RID j ). After receiving H(S⊕ID⊕RID')⊕λ, H(S⊕ID⊕RID")⊕λ, N T from each tag, the reader should calculate H(N R ⊕N T ), then calculate α = H(N R ⊕N T )⊕(H(S⊕ID⊕RID')⊕λ) and β = H(N R ⊕N T ) ⊕(H(S⊕ID⊕ RID")⊕λ). If α = H(S new_i ⊕ID i ⊕RID j ), the specific tag is searched, or the reader checks whether β = H(S old_i ⊕ID i ⊕RID j ) or not, if β = H(S old_i ⊕ ID i ⊕RID j ), the specific tag is searched, but in the previous authentication access, the tag has not updated S successfully for some reason. If α <> H(S new_i ⊕ID i ⊕RID j ) andβ <> H(S old_i ⊕ID i ⊕RID j ), then the tag is not the specific tag that the server would search.
Security Analysis
We would analyze this protocol to evaluate whether it meets the security requirements as follows: (1 In each session, the mobile reader would generate a new random N R and a tag would generate a new random N T , so replay attack can be prevented in this protocol due to the message transmitted for each access is different. Different value of H(N R ⊕N T ) is utilized in individual access and N T plays a key role in providing different value of H(N R ⊕N T ) to conceal H(S⊕ID⊕RID'), H(S⊕ID⊕RID") of the tag. An adversary cannot acquire H() so as to calculate H(N R ⊕N T ), so it is impossible for the adversary to perform replay attack.
(5)Denial of Service (DoS) attack
This protocol is based on dynamic ID mechanism, for solving the problem of Denial of Service attack in a execution access of corresponding authentication protocol of this RFID system, the shared value S old and S new between the backend server and the tag should be considered, so H(S new_i ⊕ID i ⊕RID j ), H(S new_i ⊕ID i ), H(S old_i ⊕ID i ⊕RID j ), H(S old_i ⊕ID i ) have been calculated, H(S new_i ⊕ID i ⊕RID j ) and H(S old_i ⊕ID i ⊕RID j ) are regarded as authentication secret. Even if the backend server and the tag have lost synchronization for some reason in previous authentication access, the tag can be searched successfully. This protocol can protect the search result of a mobile reader. Because all tags nearby the mobile reader respond to the request, an adversary cannot learn whether the mobile reader found a specific tag or not. Even if the specific tag itself cannot know whether the mobile reader wants to find him or not. Since T i does not know the identifier RID j of the reader, T i cannot decide whether the RID' or RID" which is extracted from the received broadcasted message is correct or not. Table 3 indicates a comparison of results among our search protocol and the related search protocols [8, 16, 17] in terms of security. 
Conclusion
Mobile RFID systems suffer from more privacy and security problems. Therefore, in this paper, we analyze security requirements for RFID search protocols firstly; then pointing out the shortcomings of one typical RFID search protocol; based on the analyzed result, a new RFID search protocol which meets the requirements for mobile readers is proposed. The careful security analysis shows that this protocol has well security properties.
